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THE ANTITRUST LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS AFTER GOLDFARB:
REFORMULATING THE LEARNED
PROFESSIONS EXEMPTION IN
THE LOWER COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' the Supreme
Court renounced an unlimited exemption from the Sherman Act for learned
professions, ruling that such an exemption would contravene the policy
underlying the Act. However, it did not declare that the learned professions
were on an equal footing with business; in fact, in a much-discussed
footnote, the Court specifically preserved the profession-business distinc-
tion in antitrust analysis. 2 The opinion did not articulate the nature or extent
of this distinction, except to say that the "public service aspect and other
features" of professions should be considered. As a result, lower courts,
faced with the difficult problem of formulating a more precise definition of
the learned profession exemption (LPE), have been forced to carefully
analyze the language of Goldfarb.-In this effort, they have also relied upon
the recent Supreme Court treatment of the related state action exemption
(SAE). The resulting interpretations of the LPE, although scarcely uniform,
have tended to emphasize the public service and state interest aspects of the
professions. Further, the LPE has been treated not as an unqualified exemp-
tion but rather as a rule for the separate treatment of professional activities
under the antitrust laws.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the characteristics of the LPE as
it has been developed in post-Goldfarb lower court cases. First, however, it
will be necessary to examine the key elements of the Goldfarb decision as
well as the relevant aspects of the recent SAE case, Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co. 3 The Note will then discuss lower court developments in light of this
Supreme Court framework, deriving a model which incorporates the direc-
tives of Goldfarb and the "spirit" of Cantor.
1. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2. Id. at 788 n.17.
3. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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I. THE GOLDFARB DECISION
The development of a new analysis of the LPE, left chiefly to the lower
courts, has been based upon a set of precepts and techniques extracted
from Goldfarb. In that case, prospective homeowners sued the county and
state bar associations in Virginia alleging that the minimum fee schedules
for title examination published by the county bar association and enforced
by the state bar association constituted price-fixing in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. Refusing to immunize either defendant under the SAE
or the LPE, the Court held that the challenged activities violated the
Sherman Act. There are five key elements to be examined in analyzing the
Goldfarb opinion: the special malignancy of fee control activities; the
factors considered by the Court in affixing the label "price-fixing" to the
complained-of activities; the vague preservation of the profession-business
distinction in footnote seventeen; the analysis of the congressional intent
behind the Sherman Act in relation to state action; and recognition of the
compelling nature of the states' interests in the practice of the learned
professions, especially law, within their boundaries.
A. Fee Control Activities: A Special Case?
The Goldfarb Court recognized the basis traditionally relied upon to
distinguish professions from trades-that the goal of professional activities
is not to enhance profit, but to provide services necessary for the communi-
tya-but noted that this justification "loses some of its force when used to
support the fee control activities involved here. "5 It went on to remark that
"the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a service
for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word. It is no
disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it
has this business aspect . ''6
This language carries a strong implication that the traditional "public
service versus profit" justification for a profession-trade distinction is still
4. Thus, goes the argument, there is a possibility of harm to the public from professional
competition. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). The LPE
had its origin in dicta in several cases arising in the early 1930's. Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932) (explicitly recognizing a learned profession-trade
distinction); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (practice of medicine is not a trade).
While the distinction came to be well-recognized, see, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1956) (professions may deserve special consideration because of
distinguishing "ethical, historical and practical" considerations), professions were nonetheless
subject to antitrust laws, United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485
(1950) (standard real estate commissions, set by District of Columbia Real Estate Board, were
held to be illegal as price-fixing); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943)
(medical profession). The Supreme Court did not rule directly on the validity of the LPE until
Goldfarb. See generally Note, The End of Fee Schedules: The Sherman Act Applies to Lawyers
Also, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 464 (1976).
5. 421 U.S. at 787.
6. Id. at 787-88.
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recognized in most situations ,7 but that activities primarily directed toward
prices (such as fee control activities) are simply outside the protection of this
public service cloak. 8 Thus, under this interpretation, all professional ac-
tivities would be eligible for special treatment under the LPE except those
that possess two characteristics. First, the activity being restrained (for
example, title examination in Goldfarb) must be "commercial";9 which,
according to the Court, simply means that the activity is done in exchange
for money. Under the Court's analysis, almost all professional activities will
fulfill this requirement. Second, and more importantly, the restraining
activity (such as publication of minimum fee schedules in Goldfarb) must
relate directly to price control or stabilization. This means that the LPE may
continue to cover all professional activities except those that relate to fees.
B. Labeling Activities as Price-Fixing.
The complaint in Goldfarb charged that the defendant bar associations
had engaged in price-fixing by publishing minimum fee schedules which
had the purpose and effect of setting price floors for title examinations. The
Court was thus faced with the initial task of characterizing these activities,
either as price-fixing or as permissible business practices. The importance of
this characterization process cannot be overemphasized: in the absence of an
exemption, price-fixing is clearly a "per se" violation of the Sherman
Act.' 0 The Goldfarb Court, however, did not follow the same characteriza-
tion procedure as is usually utilized in price-fixing cases not involving the
professions.
Admitting that an advisory fee schedule would present a different
question,"' the Court noted that "here a naked agreement was clearly
shown, and the effect on prices is plain.'" 12 Thus far, the analysis mirrored
the usual search for a forbidden purpose and effect, which together are
generally sufficient to constitute price-fixing. 13 However, the Court went on
7. However, the distinction survives only as the basis for a rule for different treatment,
rather than as an absolute exemption. See notes 20-24 infra and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the special importance of fee control activities, see Special Project,
Recent Developments in Attorneys'Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685 (1976).
9. The characterization of an activity as "business" or "commerce" is a jurisdictional
prerequisite for the application of the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraints on "trade or
commerce." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970); 421 U.S. at 788 (section 1 of the Sherman Act extends to
any person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize interstate
commerce). Thus, such a characterization is an essential first step in any Sherman Act analysis.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11. An advisory fee schedule might present a different question for two reasons. First, it
would probably have a less severe anticompetitive effect. Second, the legitimate purpose of
disseminating information would prevail over any anticompetitive purpose, possibly triggering
first amendment protections. For a related discussion, see Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee
Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475,492
(1977) and Note, supra note 4, at 467.
12. 421 U.S. at 782.
13. For example, in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966), the
1049
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1977:1047
to point out that, due to the monopoly held by the legal profession in the area
of title examination,14 the "price-fixing activities" were unusually damag-
ing to the consumer. 5 Noting "a pricing system that consumers could not
realistically escape," the Court concluded that "respondents' activities
constitute a classic illustration of price-fixing." 16
Since the Court did not conclusively state that the activities constituted
price-fixing until after it had discussed the egregious nature of the harm
involved, 17 this section of Goldfarb suggests that a greater preliminary
showing by the plaintiff would be required in challenging the alleged price-
fixing activities of a professional association 18 than in challenging non-
professional business activities. Such an analysis would help vitiate the
harshness of the implied holding that all price-fixing activities are beyond
the protection of the LPE by incorporating a version of the rule of reason
into the preliminary labeling process. 19
C. Footnote Seventeen: Preservation of the Distinction.
Immediately after noting that the profession of law has a business
aspect which is subject to the Sherman Act, in footnote seventeen the Court
explicitly preserved the profession-trade distinction:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether
Court held that the goal of restraining prices is unlawful per se when effected by combination or
conspiracy even though the effect upon prices is indirect. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), the Court held that the practice of fixing prices is conclusively
presumed to be harmful and illegal, without regard to the precise harm caused or the business
excuse offered for its use. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219-20
(1940), the Court held that proof of a purpose to raise prices and proof that the challenged
activities actually contributed to a price rise or to market stability, is sufficient to establish
price-fixing as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. In none of these cases did the Court feel
compelled to consider the extent of the harm.
14. This monopoly was itself challenged in Surety Title Ins. Agency v. Virginia State Bar,
431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 98-106
infra.
15. 421 U.S. at 782.
16. Id. at 783.
17. The fact that the Court looked to the extent of the harm in deciding whether to label
these fee schedules as "price-fixing" was mentioned in Note, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar-
Applying the Antitrust Laws to the Legal Profession, 19 How. L.J. 149, 154 (1976). The same
kind of "prelabeling" analysis has been proposed as a way to explain the confusion in the area
of group boycotts. See Comment, Boycott: A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a
Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 818 (1977).
18. It could be argued, however, that the Court's use of the phrase "price-fixing activities"
in its discussion of the harm to the consumer indicates that the price-fixing label was affixed
merely upon a showing of a prohibited purpose and effect, in accordance with the general
procedure.
19. See the related discussion of United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs,
555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 51 (1977) (No. 76-1767), in text accompanying
notes 77-84 infra.
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that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealist-
ic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-
trust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a par-
ticular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. 20
The extent to which this footnote limits the Court's prior statements is
unclear. One plausible interpretation is that the antitrust concept of a per se
violation, developed in the trade context, might not be carried over to cases
involving the professions, to which a rule of reason test would be applied.21
This finds some meager support in the Court's consideration of the egregi-
ous nature of the harm to the consumer, 22 but is weakened by the over-all
flavor of the opinion, 23 which seems to treat price-fixing as a per se violation
even in the professional context. 24 In any event, footnote seventeen clearly
preserves the LPE, at least as a rule for special treatment of professional
anticompetitive activities.
D. Congressional Intent and State Action.
After the Goldfarb Court noted that section 1 of the Sherman Act was
intended to strike as broadly as possible, 25 it discussed the holding in Parker
20. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
21. Note, however, that the LPE could really only have meaning in a per se context, since
in a rule of reason case the relevant considerations (for example, state interest) can be
accounted for in the normal balancing process.
22. See notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text.
23. The commentators disagree as to whether the Goldfarb Court applied a per se analysis
to the price-fixing activities before it. Compare Martyn, Lawyer Advertising: The Unique
Relationship Between First Amendment and Antitrust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 183
(1977) (the Court declined to find a per se violation, but the burden of justifying the pernicious
effect of a minimum fee schedule is so overwhelming that the only real distinction between
Goldfarb and per se price-fixing cases is that the Court will consider "noncommercial"
difenses) and Price-Fixing, Advertising Bans, and Other Self-Regulation by Lawyers: What
Future Under the Antitrust Laws?, 12 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 531,538-40 (1976) (comments of
Mr. Malina) (Goldfarb did not apply a per se rule; the lack of discussion of the reasonableness
of a minimum fee schedule was the result of the Court rejecting it out of hand under the rule of
reason test) with Branca & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 507 (Goldfarb treated minimum fee
schedules as a per se violation); Comment, Antitrust Law: Minimum Fee Schedules Violate the
Sherman Act, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 485, 487 n.29 (1976) (the Court did not even entertain the
argument that the strict per se rule should be inapplicable in Goldfarb) and Comment, Sherman
Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV.
1135, 1143-44 (1976) (the Goldfarb Court applied a per se rule). Since the Court never dis-
cussed, or even mentioned, the issue of the reasonableness of the fee schedules, it seems most
likely that a per se rule was applied.
24. Of course, the Court seems to treat price-fixing as an especially damaging practice,
even compared to other per se violations. For the lower court treatment of other per se
violations, see text accompanying notes 53-76 infra.
25. 421 U.S. at 787.
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v. Brown26 that the Act was intended to regulate private practices and not to
prohibit a state from imposing restraints.27 Specifically, the Court said,
"The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state
action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the
activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." 28 "It is not enough
that anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action . ... 29 Thus,
the Court clearly limited the extent of the SAE, leaving open the question of
what additional inquiries must be made. This "limiting" attitude toward the
SAE, further emphasized in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,30 is significant in
that it has influenced the development of the LPE by analogy. 31
E. The Compelling State Interest in the Practice of Professions.
In the most significant part of the opinion, at least as an augur of things
to come, the Goldfarb Court concluded by recognizing that states have a
compelling interest in, and broad regulatory power over, the practice of
professions within their boundaries. Thus, "in some instances the State may
decide that 'forms of competition usual in the business world may be
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.' "32 This state interest
is especially strong in the regulation of lawyers, who as "officers of the
court" are essential to the primary governmental function of administering
justice. 33 The Court specifically noted that its holding was not intended as a
diminution of the authority of a state to regulate its professions. 34
This section of Goldfarb has at least two major implications: first, it
appears to vitiate the limiting language earlier in the opinion, giving the LPE
a new source of life; and second, it indicates that the development of the
LPE will be affected in some way by its relationship to the SAE.35 Thus, a
consideration of new developments in the treatment of the SAE is relevant.
III. CANTOR V. DETROIT EDISON Co.
The ambiguity of Goldfarb has forced the lower courts to seek further
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27. 421 U.S. at 788.
28. Id. at 790.
29. Id. at 791.
30. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See text accompanying notes 36-51 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
32. 421 U.S. at 792 (quoting United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952)).
33. See notes 86-106 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the special case of the
legal profession.
34. 421 U.S. at 793.
35. This section of the opinion has been interpreted as a suggestion by the Court that the
dangers of competition should hereafter be minimized by direct state regulation rather than, for
example, state authorized self-regulation. Comment, Antitrust: Minimum Fee Schedules Vio-
late the Sherman Act, supra note 23, at 489.
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guidance from Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,36 a recent Supreme Court SAE
case. In Cantor, the challenged activity was a light bulb exchange program
initiated by the defendant utility company in 1886 and approved in 1916 by
the newly-created Michigan Public Service Commission, which possessed
complete power to regulate utilities. The Court assumed without opining
that the activity would be an illegal restraint of competition without the
approval of the Commission, and dealt solely with the effect of the Commis-
sion's approval of the program.
In deciding that the program was not exempt by virtue of a state action
shield, the Court contributed three valuable analytical elements to the
ongoing discussion of the relationship between the Sherman Act and state
action: first, a narrow reading of Parker v. Brown37 as holding only that
action by a state official is exempt, thus emphasizing the actor rather than
the activity for exemption purposes; second, an emphasis upon the relative
extent of state and private participation in the decision-making process
concerning challenged activities; and finally, recognition of a congressional
intent to exempt private activity only to the minimum extent necessary to
make a state regulatory act work.
In Parker,38 the Court held that public officials charged by state statute
with the duty of administering an anticompetitive program did not violate
the Sherman Act in discharging that duty. The Court stated, "The Sherman
Act. . .gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state." 39 The Cantor plurality gave Parker a very
narrow reading, limiting the holding to an exemption for official action
taken by state officials.n0 This view of Parker is in accord with the statement
in Goldfarb that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate private actions
36. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). For an exhaustive study of the evolution of the state action
exemption, see Comment, The State Action Exemption in Antitrust: From Parker v. Brown to
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DUKE L.J. 871.
37. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
38. Brown, a producer and packer of raisins, sought an injunction against the enforcement
of a California program designed to restrict competition among growers and maintain prices in
the distribution of raisins to packers. The defendants included the California Director of
Agriculture and other public officials. Although Brown based his claim on his constitutional
right to engage in interstate commerce, the Court, on its own motion, directed the parties to
discuss the question of whether the California statute violated the Sherman Act. Finding for the
defendants, the Court stated, "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers as agents from
activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. The Court did note, however, that "[wie
have no question of the state. . becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination
by others for restraint of trade." Id. at 351-52.
39. Id. at 351.
40. 428 U.S. at 589-91.
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and not those of the government. 4' It appears that, within this narrow
sphere, the exemption is absolute, regardless of the nature of the state policy
behind the official action, or the nature of the action itself.42
Although the Cantor Court limited the Parker holding to action by
state officials, it recognized that, in certain circumstances, private action
could be protected by the SAE. Specifically, the Court stated that it would
be unjust to impose Sherman Act liability upon a private actor who was
merely obeying a state command. 43 However, the Court conditioned the
application of this "state command" aspect of the SAE upon whether the
private actor had participated in the decision-making process concerning the
activity. Although there could be situations where the state's participation in
the decision was so dominant as to exempt the private actor, mere state
authorization, approval, encouragement or joint participation would not be
enough to trigger the exemption. 44 Thus, in Cantor, the initiation of the
bulb exchange program by the private defendant was enough to defeat its
claim of exemption under the "state command" theory, even though subse-
quent state approval compelled continuation of the program until a new
program was filed by the defendant and approved by the Commission.
Again, this branch of the SAE does not focus on the nature of the
activity or its relation to state policy, but merely inquires as to the involve-
ment of the private actor in the decision to engage in the activity. 45 The
theory is similar to that justifying the state official action branch of the
exemption; namely, that Congress did not intend to affect direct state
activity by the Sherman Act, but only private actions. When a private actor
has no legal alternative under state law but to engage in restrictive activity,
and had nothing to do with the decision to require that activity, then the
action is not really private. As there is no private volitional act which could
41. 421 U.S. at 778.
42. Note the difference between this exemption, relating to the identity of the actor, and
the Cantor state regulation exemption, see text accompanying notes 47-50 infra, which focuses
on the relationship between private actions and state regulatory programs. This is emphasized
by the Cantor Court's statement that "the only way the legality of any program may be tested
under the Sherman Act is by determining whether the persons who administer it have acted
lawfully. The federal statute proscribes the conduct of persons, not programs. .. "428 U.S.
at 601.
43. 428 U.S. at 592.
44. Id.
45. It has been argued forcefully that Cantor is susceptible of two readings concerning the
prerequisites for application of the SAE to private actions required by the state. One reading is
that there are two separate and distinct tests, with satisfaction of either sufficient to qualify for
the exemption. These two tests are: (a) whether the decision to require the activity was that of
the state, and (b) whether the activity is necessary to support a state regulatory program. The
other reading is that there is only one test, requiring satisfaction of both (a) and (b) above.
Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 27 CAsE W.
RES. L. REV. 503, 513 (1977). Dorman prefers the second interpretation.
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be deterred, there is no sense in applying the Sherman Act; to do so would
be grossly unfair to the private actor.
46
The Cantor Court recognized a third branch of the SAE for activities
required by state law and necessary to make a state regulatory program
work.4 7 The theory behind this "state regulation exemption" is that
Congress did not intend to impose an additional regulatory mechanism upon
an area of the economy already regulated by the state. Thus, when the
competitive standard imposed by the antitrust laws is actually inconsistent
with the public interest standard enforced by the state regulatory agencies,
and would interfere with the state regulatory program, a very limited
exemption will be granted. 8 Here, in determining when there is an actual
conflict, the nature of the activity and the state policy involved will play
important roles.49 For example, in Cantor the state regulatory interest
extended to the distribution of electricity, but not of light bulbs. The Court
found that there was no real interference with state policy by the particular
application of the antitrust laws sought by the plaintiff and refused to grant
an exemption under the "state regulation" theory. 50 It is this third branch of
the SAE, emphasizing that the challenged activity must be directly and
necessarily connected to the success of a state regulatory program, which
has been, by analogy, the central theme in the reformulation of the LPE.51
IV. LOWER COURT DEVELOPMENTS: BODDICKER AND
SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS
As noted above, the Goldfarb Court explicitly preserved the trade-
profession distinction, not as an "exemption," but as a rule for special
treatment of professional activities under the antitrust laws. The Court did
not explicate the characteristics that would trigger the application of this
special rule, or the nature of the special treatment involved. However, it did
46. Conditioning the availability of the SAE upon the amount of participation of the
individual in the decision-making process can create a difficult problem in deciding where to
"draw the line." As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610,
every state enactment is initiated by its beneficiaries. The application of a "role in the decision-
making process" criterion might end up advantaging those who are powerful enough to lobby
privately and surreptitiously. See Recent Developments, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 5
HOFSTRA L. Rav. 673, 683 (1977).
47. 428 U.S. at 597.
48. The implication is that the SAE avoids conflicts, not between state and federal laws
(which would be easy to resolve under the supremacy clause), but between state and federal
systems of regulation, which the framers of the Sherman Act are deemed to have intended to
coexist. See generally Boomer, Chamberlain, Horn, Weart & Winston, Advertising Restrictions
on Licensed Occupations: An Antitrust Approach, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 729, 747 (1977).
49. The non-participation requirement of the "state command" exemption will probably
have no place here, as the justifications for the two exemptions are different, although related.
But see note 45 supra.
50. 428 U.S. at 598.
51. However, an "old" LPE never existed except in dicta. See note 4 supra.
1055
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
hint that fee control activities would not be exempt under any circum-
stances, and suggested several possible interpretations of the nature of this
special treatment. The possibilities include an across-the-board application
of the "rule of reason,'"52 a more rigorous requirement for labeling activities
as per se violations and a lower standard of judicial scrutiny of justifications
for challenged professional activities, increasing their chances of surviving a
balancing test.
A. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association.
One significant lower court contribution to the development of the LPE
is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boddicker v.
Arizona State Dental Association ." In that case, plaintiff dentists alleged
that two local Arizona dental associations and the American Dental Associa-
tion (ADA)54 conspired among themselves to require membership in the
ADA as a condition precedent to membership in the local associations, thus
"creating an anticompetitive tying arrangement" in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.55
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. In reversing, the court of appeals noted that
the challenged activities were no more tenuous and remote from interstate
commerce than were the title examinations by lawyers that were successful-
ly challenged in Goldfarb. It then dealt at length with the question of
whether dentistry is exempt from the Sherman Act as a learned profession. 56
Recognizing that the Goldfarb decision had done little to define the
extent of the LPE, the Boddicker court drew upon the Cantor analysis that
the SAE extended no further than was necessary to make the state regulatory
program work. 57 The court used the same principle--of limiting the exemp-
tion to activities closely tied to the theoretical justifications for the exemp-
tion-in holding that "to survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular
practice, rule or regulation of a profession. . . must serve the purpose for
which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public. Those which only
52. See Martyn, supra note 23, at 182.
53. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 73 (1977).
54. All of the defendant associations were private, nonprofit organizations having the
avowed goal of improving public health and the profession of dentistry. While membership in
the local associations was not a prerequisite to the practice of dentistry in Arizona, it did carry
with it substantial benefits. 549 F.2d at 626.
55. Id. at 628.
56. The state in no way required these activities, but merely delegated regulatory authority
to a state-created board of dentists. ARIz. Rev. STAT. §§ 32-1203, -1207 (West 1956). Thus, the
Cantor exemptions were inapplicable and, in fact, no question of state action was raised in the
opinion. This illustrates that the LPE is indeed separate and distinct from the SAE, having
application to situations involving private action merely approved by the state.
57. 549 F.2d at 631.
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suppress competition between practitioners will fail to survive the chal-
lenge." 58
After announcing this test, the court summarily noted that the challeng-
ed activities were not so obviously designed to improve dental services to
the public as to permit it to sustain a motion to dismiss the complaint. The
case was then remanded to the lower court. Further proceedings would
allow the plaintiff to demonstrate the extent of the tying arrangements'
anticompetitive effects, and the defendants to demonstrate the benefits of
the practice. 59
1. The criteria which trigger the application of the learned
profession exemption.
Although dealing mainly with the nature of the LPE, Boddicker of
necessity also contained implications as to the conditions of its application.
For example, the court assumed without discussion that dentistry was a
learned profession eligible for special treatment. The only special character-
istic of the defendant associations mentioned by the court was that all were
non-profit organizations. 60
The court also ignored the fact that the alleged tying arrangements, if
proved, would constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 61 The clear
implication, is that the LPE is to be applied regardless of whether the
challenged activities would be classed as a per se violation in other contexts.
This seems inconsistent with Goldfarb, which applied standard antitrust
analysis to professional fee control activities. However, Goldfarb can be
58. Id. at 632.
59. Id.
60. The lower courts have not dealt specifically with the definition of a "learned profes-
sion," although inferences can be drawn from their holdings and from the theory behind the
LPE. Specifically, in each case where the courts have treated a livelihood as a profession in the
antitrust context, the state has delegated it self-regulatory powers. E.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§
2-1803, -1805, -1808 (West 1966). This is the best criterion for defining a "learned profession,"
because the LPE is based on the theory that the state has imposed a non-competitive standard
upon professions by allowing them to regulate themselves, in effect allowing them limited
monopoly powers.
To complicate the classification further, the majority in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council recognized the possibility of distinction between profes-
sions, saying:
The distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require con-
sideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not
dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and decep-
tion if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
425 U.S. 748,773 n.25 (1976) (emphasis in original). This possibility has not been explored in the
cases, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977) (No. 76-
1767), did leave open the possibility of distinguishing between professions for purposes of LPE
analysis. 555 F.2d at 982; see text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
61. E.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,498 (1969) (a
tying arrangement is a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
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construed narrowly as applying only to fee control activities, and not to
other per se violations like tying arrangements. 62 Such a reading is suggest-
ed by the Boddicker court's failure to consider the per se nature of tying
arrangements as an obstacle to the application of the LPE. Thus, when read
in conjunction with Goldfarb, Boddicker suggests that all traditional per se
violations except price-fixing will be eligible for the LPE.
2. The nature of the LPE.
The main contribution of the Boddicker opinion is its discussion of the
nature of the special treatment to be accorded eligible activities under the
LPE. To survive a Sherman Act challenge, the activity must serve the
purpose for which the profession exists: it must contribute directly to
improving service to the public. An activity which only supresses competi-
tion among practioners will not survive the challenge. 63 As noted above,
this "public benefit" defense will apply even to those professional activities
which fall within most traditional per se categories of offenses. Unfortunate-
ly, Boddicker does not make clear the way in which the public benefit
analysis is to be conducted nor the extent to which the challenged practice
must serve the public interest in order to overcome its anticompetitive
effect.
The court's language can be read to indicate that the "direct contribu-
tion to public benefit" requirement for exemption is invariant in degree,
regardless of the extent of the anticompetitive effects of the challenged
activities. Of course, in areas traditionally subject to rule of reason analysis,
even if the activity is not so closely tied to the public benefit as to win the
profession exemption, it may survive the Sherman Act challenge clue to a
minimal anticompetitive purpose and effect. However, the language of
Boddicker implies that, in per se areas such as tying arrangements, the
anticompetitive effect will be presumed, and a fixed standard of benefit
must be reached to win exemption. To this extent the per se analysis would
be retained, but only as evidence of a fixed degree of harm to be balanced
against the benefits. A remaining question is whether classification of an
activity as a traditional per se violation would be conclusive or only pre-
sumptive evidence of harm.
The general approach suggested in Boddicker was taken by a federal
district court in Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad,64 a
62. Footnote seventeen is good authority for such a construction. See text accompanying
notes 20-24 supra. See also the dissent of Judge Fitzgerald in Boddicker, 549 F.2d at 633-34,
discussed in note 76 infra.
63. 549 F.2d at 632.
64. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (1976), modified on other grounds, No. TCA 75-186 (Dec. 3, 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 77-1924 (5th Cir. 1977). Here a women's health center which provided
first trimester elective abortions sued several physicians, alleging that they had engaged in a
group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act. Finding that the plaintiff had sustained its
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1976 Florida case involving an alleged economic boycott by a medical
association. The historical effect of pleading a per se violation such as a
boycott65 was to free the plaintiff from having to show that the restraint was
unreasonable, or that it harmed the public, these elements being presumed
conclusively. In addition, evidence of good intentions, or of public benefit,
was deemed irrelevant. 66 However, Goldfarb made the professions a special
case under the antitrust regulatory scheme, requiring that the impact of state
regulation and policy be measured in any action against professionals. Thus,
the question faced by the Feminist court was whether the per se doctrine
could be applied at all in such a case and, if so, to what extent.67
The court felt that the per se doctrine should be applied to some extent
since "whatever else it may be, the medical profession constitutes in large
part the rendering of a service for money and is in that sense a business.
Moreover, . . . an economic boycott. . . carried out by members of the
medical profession is no less antithetical to free competition than is an
economic boycott carried out by nonprofessionals. "68 However, since Flori-
da had delegated self-regulation responsibilities to the medical profession,
good intentions would be a defense even to a per se violation. The court felt
that this would protect the state's interest in regulating its professions, while
recognizing the federal policy behind the Sherman Act. Under this ap-
proach, the plaintiff would have to prove only that the defendant engaged in
a combination or conspiracy in the nature of a boycott; then the defendant
would have the opportunity of proving good faith to rebut the per se
presumption of unreasonableness. 69
Feminist can be criticized for allowing a "good faith" defense, par-
ticularly since the plaintiff was merely seeking a preliminary injunction. 70
Whatever the applicability of the defendant's good faith in an action seeking
to subject him to personal liability,71 it is not a relevant consideration in
burden of establishing a substantial probability of success on the merits, the court nonetheless
denied preliminary injunctive relief on the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm prior to a trial on the merits. 415 F. Supp. at 1270-71.
65. The group boycott is labeled a per se violation, Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941), but is often treated as being subject to the rule of
reason. See Comment, supra note 17. See also McCormick, Group Boycott-Per Se or Not Per
Se, That is the Question, 7 SroN HALL L. REV. 703 (1977). This might help explain the fact that
a boycott does not receive per se treatment in the professional context of Feminist. However,
the court's language seems to apply to other, more accepted per se violations as well.
66. Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
67. 415 F. Supp. at 1263.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1262.
71. For example, in the context of the SAE, the Cantor plurality seemed to recognize
"unfairness" as a defense to an action for treble damages. 428 U.S. at 599.
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reconciling the state and federal interests in a professional activity alleged to
restrain competition. The LPE is based on the theory that activities which
are presumed to be harmful in a free market context because of anticompeti-
tive effects might in fact not be harmful in a professional context, due to the
public interest regulatory scheme enforced by the state. 72 An interpretation
of the LPE which bases it upon good intentions misses the point, since it
does not make the exemption contingent upon the actual effects of the
activities in the professional context. The Boddicker public benefit defense
is clearly superior, particularly in view of Cantor's emphasis upon the
necessity of a close relationship between the effects of the challenged
activities and their theoretical justification.
More interesting is Feminist's retention of the per se rule as conclusive
evidence of harm, while allowing a defense not generally available in per se
contexts. This position is in accord with the reading of Boddicker men-
tioned above. The Feminist court justified its approach by noting that the
anticompetitive effect of the challenged activities will not vary between
professional and business contexts, since professions have a business as-
pect. 73 This is true, but the court makes the mistake of equating anticompeti-
tive effect with the harm to be plugged into a balancing equation. The same
reasoning that supports the recognition of a "benefit defense"--the differ-
ent context of professional activities-also supports a requirement that the
plaintiff prove actual harm to the public from the anticompetitive effects of
the defendant's activities. It is entirely possible that such anticompetitive
activities would not be harmful due to the effectiveness of the state's
regulatory program enforcing a public interest standard rather than a
competitive standard. Per se rules should not be applied until judicial
familiarity with such contexts has reached a more advanced state. At most,
the per se classification of challenged professional activities should create a
presumption of harm.
An alternative, and better, interpretation of Boddicker, indicated by
the court's instructions on remand,74 is that the LPE is really an exemption
from the application of per se rules, and that where it is available the court
will conduct a rule of reason analysis even in the most traditional per se
areas. As noted above, such a balancing approach accurately reflects the
underlying justification for a learned profession distinction,75 allows flexi-
bility and encourages the input of information in an unfamiliar context.
72. See note 4 supra.
73. 415 F. Supp. at 1263.
74. The district court was instructed to consider the extent of both the anticompetitive
effect and the benefit. 549 F.2d at 632.
75. It has been suggested that the state interest basis of the LPE should result in a very lax
standard of judicial review of professional activities:
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Under this reading, Boddicker tracks the implications of footnote
seventeen in Goldfarb by establishing an across-the-board balancing test for
anticompetitive professional activities. Recognizing the state interests be-
hind the LPE, the Boddicker court required that the activity be sustained
only if its direct contribution to the public benefit outweighs its anticompeti-
tive effects. The limiting language of Goldfarb and Cantor was thereby
honored while the underlying policies of the LPE were heeded. In conduct-
ing the balancing test, the court indicated that it would employ an active
standard of review, requiring an actual showing of public benefits and
harmful anticompetitive effects, rather than relying on presumptions evolv-
ed in other areas. 76
B. United States v. National Society of Professional Engineers.
Although Boddicker effectively combined the implications of Gold-
farb and Cantor into a workable rule, it left some gaps in the emerging
picture of the LPE. Particularly, the question of whether the special balanc-
ing test would apply to professional price-fixing activities was left unre-
solved. The opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. National Society of Professional Engineers77 helps to
complete the picture.
In Society of Engineers, it was alleged that the efforts of the National
Society of Professional Engineers (Society) to enforce a provision of its
Code of Ethics prohibiting any form of competitive bidding on engineering
projects violated the Sherman Act. The Society argued that Goldfarb left
room for restraints on competition among professionals which serve a
reasonable objective. It then attempted to justify the rule by claiming that it
served to eliminate the deception and poor execution likely to result from
competition. In the course of holding the Society's activities in violation of
If, for example, the justification for the [anticompetitive] scheme lies in the protection
of health or safety, the strength of that justification is forcefully attested to by the
existence of a state enactment. I would assess the justifications of such enactments in
the same way as is done in equal protection review, and where such justifications are
at all substantial (as one would expect them to be in the case of most professional
licensing or fee-setting schemes, for example . . .), I would be reluctant to find the
restraint unreasonable.
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 611 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This reasoning seems to ignore congres-
sional intent to strike as broadly as possible with the Sherman Act, as well as the existing
safeguards for state integrity in the antitrust area. Boddicker, exemplifying a very active
standard of review, seems to be a better approach.
76. Judge Fitzgerald, in dissent, gave Goldfarb an entirely different reading, construing it
narrowly as holding only that certain business or commercial aspects of professions are subject
to regulation. 549 F.2d at 633. This interpretation ignores the language of footnote seventeen
and the lesson of Cantor, made applicable to the LPE by Goldfarb's emphasis on the similar
policies underlying the LPE and the SAE. Both strongly imply that professional activities will
not win an absolute exemption under any circumstances.
77. 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 51 (1977) (No. 76-1767).
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the Sherman Act, the court dealt at length with the treatment to be given
alleged professional price-fixing activities.
Initially, the court of appeals upheld the district court's finding that the
challenged activities constituted price-fixing, quoting with approval the
district court's discussion:
In determining that the fee schedule in Goldfarb constituted a
price-fixing practice, the Court emphasized the nature of the restraint,
the enforcement mechanism, and the fee schedule's adverse impact
upon consumers.
.. .Since engineering services are indispensable to almost any
construction project, and since alternative sources . . . are non-exis-
tent, the impact upon the public of defendant's pricing restraint is
plain.78
Here, as in Goldfarb, it appears possible that the court required a showing
different from that ordinarily required to label activities price-fixing by
focusing on an examination of actual harm to the consumer. Under this
approach, the rule of reason would be applied in the labeling process rather
than in the process of determining whether the activities should be charac-
terized as violating the Sherman Act.
After characterizing the activities as "price-fixing," the court of ap-
peals upheld the district court's application of a per se rule, emphasizing the
singularly important role played by competitive pricing in the market.
79 It
qualified its approval by saying that a price-fixing rule stands at least
presumptively condemned in a way that does not apply to other trade
practice rules. As the Society's rule was on its face universal in application,
it was presumptively condemned. However, the district court "did not take
the rule solely on its face, and reach a condemnatory result merely because
of an unfortunate use of language. It assessed the rule by taking into account
how it had operated in fact, and with what practical anti-competitive conse-
quences. "80 This was enough; "[s]ound antitrust doctrine did not require a
simulation of a 'cost-benefit ratio' analysis, or a 'balancing' of the benefits
accruing from competitive restraints of this nature." 8 There was no exami-
nation of benefits. This section of the opinion, although unclear, seems to
retain the application of some sort of per se rule of at least presumptive
condemnation. Further, the "benefit defense" of Boddicker appears to be
unavailable in price-fixing contexts. However, the Society of Engineers
court wavered on this latter point.
78. 555 F.2d at 981 n.3 (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404
F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975)).
79. 555 F.2d at 981.
80. Id. at 9.82.
81. Id.
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The court went on to state that it did not mean to imply that there was
no room in antitrust law for ethical rules of practice for the learned profes-
sions. The Society's broad ban was simply not justified by the vague
rationalization offered in its defense-the prevention of harm to the public.
The prohibition did not "take into account the sophistication of the pur-
chaser, the complexity of the project, or the procedures for evaluating price
information.'"82 The court strongly hinted that a refined rule, more limited
in its objectives and restraints, might be acceptable in light of the "legiti-
mate objective of preventing deceptively low bids.' '83 In concluding, the
court noted that price-fixing is generally deemed conclusively unreasonable,
but that an exception might be made for ethical rules of professional
associations narrowly confined to interdiction of abuses.84 Thus, in this
section of the opinion, the court adopts the Boddicker approach, allowing a
defense for activities closely tied to the intended benefits, while continuing
to recognize at least a presumption of harm from per se activities.
Society of Engineers does not give as clear a picture of LPE analysis in
the price-fixing context as might be hoped. Surprisingly, the one certainty is
the price-fixing activities are not to be conclusively condemned as un-
reasonable. The strong implications of Goldfarb are ignored in this regard.
At most, the harmful effects of the activities will be presumed, possibly
conclusively, but a narrow Boddicker-like defense may be available. In
theory, this is as eminently reasonable a result as that reached in Boddicker,
but it is harder to justify in light of Goldfarb, which gave no indication that
any sort of benefit defense would be allowed in price-fixing contexts.
C. The Boddicker-Society of Engineers Model.
After Boddicker and Society of Engineers, the LPE can be charac-
terized as a rule of special treatment for anticompetitive activities of profes-
sional associations, rather than as an absolute exemption. The special
treatment applies only to those activities historically classed as per se
violations of the Sherman Act; for other sorts of activities, the special
factors present in a professional context can and presumably will be incor-
porated in the rule of reason balancing test. Although the characteristics of
the LPE as developed in the lower courts have not yet been approved by the
Supreme Court, they are generally consistent with the implications of
Goldfarb and Cantor, as well as with the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the SAE.85
82. Id.
83. Id. at 983.
84. Id.
85. For example, see the discussion of Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), in
text accompanying notes 87-94 infra.
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The outlines of the LPE can be portrayed as a lock-step series of
questions. Assuming that the defendant's activities qualify as professional,
the court will first inquire if they constitute "price-fixing." For such a label
to be affixed in professional contexts, it is possible that the 'court will require
that the plaintiff show a public harm resulting from the activities, as well as
the traditional elements. If the plaintiff meets this burden, and the activities
are labeled "price-fixing," the result is unclear. The most likely interpreta-
tion is that harm will be presumed, perhaps conclusively; but a defense will
be allowed if the defendant can show that the activities are not overly broad
in light of their legitimate objectives, and have a direct beneficial effect in
helping to achieve these objectives. On the other hand, if the activities are
not labeled price-fixing, they will undergo a balancing test, weighing the
actual harm against the demonstrable public benefits.
The model seems to be a good one. It reflects recent developments in
the SAE, which are appropriate due to the similar underlying rationales of
the two exemptions; and in substituting a balancing test for an absolute
exemption it severely limits the scope of immunity, honoring the congres-
sional intent behind the Sherman Act.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CANTOR SAE AND THE BODDICKER
LPE: THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Goldfarb emphasized that the legal profession would occupy a special
position in antitrust analysis because of its dual status as a profession and a
part of the state governmental machinery. 86 On the one hand, activities of a
legal professional association might win exemption under the Boddicker
public benefit defense; on the other, they might be exempt by virtue of
governmental connections under the Cantor SAE theory. This raises the
interesting question of the relationship between the tests applied under the
two exemptions.
One difference between the two exemption theories, clearly favoring
the legal profession over all others, is that the SAE grants an unqualified
immunity to direct actions by state officials. That this immunity is likely to
be available to the legal profession is indicated by the Supreme Court's
holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,87 where plaintiff attorneys
challenged the validity of a state supreme court disciplinary rule prohibiting
attorney advertising. The Court had no trouble deciding that the SAE
applied to insulate the rule from Sherman Act liability, 88 even though the
86. 421 U.S. at 793 (1975). See text accompanying note 33 supra.
87. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
88. An interesting problem is raised by the position of advertising prohibitions under the
fourteenth amendment and the Sherman Act: a certain minimum level of state action is required
to trigger the SAE, while a certain maximum of state action is allowed before the prohibition
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only question before the Court involved price advertising. s9 Cantor was
distinguished on the ground that, in Bates, the claims were asserted directly
against the state. "The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it
adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforce-
ment process. . . . Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement
of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the appellee acts as
the agent of the court under its constant supervision." 90 As the court is the
ultimate body wielding the state's power over the practice of law, its actions
in that context are actions of the state. 91 Furthermore, whereas in Cantor the
challenged restraint did not involve any important state policy or interest,
"the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the state's power
to protect the public." 92 In Bates, "the disciplinary rules reflect a clear
articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior."
93
The lesson of Bates is that self-regulating activities of the legal profes-
sion, generally done under the supervision of the state supreme court, will
be in a good position to win exemption under the direct "state-action"
branch of SAE. The participation of the supreme court will tend to bring the
restraints under the heading of direct state action. 94 Bates may thus produce
a much greater participation of state supreme courts in the establishment of
rules of professional conduct, as state bar associations strive to move from
the Goldfarb approach to the Bates approach.
The most interesting comparison between the two exemption theories
involves private actions. If the professional defendant can show that his
violates the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it is arguable that the level of state involvement
which will trigger the fourteenth amendment is below that which is required to activate the
SAE, in light of Cantor's stringent requirements. See text accompanying notes 36-50 supra; see
generally Martyn, supra note 23, at 197.
89. The Court did not reach the question of the applicability of the LPE to the restraint on
advertising, as the SAE was held to apply. Although not likely to arise, given the Bates
alternative, it is interesting to speculate on the fate of rules restraining attorney advertising
which are for some reason not qualified to win the SAE. Such rules might not fall within per se
categories (even apart from their professional context); and they occupy a central position in
the system of lawyer self-regulation. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 509-21. Thus, they
would most likely be upheld under an LPE analysis.
90. 433 U.S. at 361.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 362.
94. It is possible to categorize the sources of restrictions on professional competitive
activities as either: (a) state statutes; (b) rules promulgated by state licensing boards; (c)
regulations initiated by private actors and adopted by the state; and (d) rules made and enforced
solely by private associations. See Boomer, Chamberlain, Horn, Weart & Winston, supra note
48, at 732-33. Identifying the source of a particular restriction is essential to an assessment of its
legality under antitrust law. For lawyers, the second category, rules promulgated by a state
licensing board, will often actually be rules promulgated by the state supreme court, thus
making the SAE available without regard to the nature and effect of the rule.
1065
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
activities were required by the state, the third branch of the SAE will be
available, allowing the defendant to show that his actions were necessary to
make a state regulatory program work and that they were not overly broad in
accomplishing that objective. Failing such a direct connection, or the neces-
sary finding that the activity was required by the state, the Boddicker public
benefit defense would still be available. What are the differences, if any,
between the two tests?
The two tests are phrased differently: the emphasis in the SAE test is
upon the connection between the challenged activities and the successful
continuation of an announced state regulatory policy; the LPE test empha-
sizes a relative weighting of the harms and benefits of the activities, without
specific reference to state regulatory programs. Nonetheless, the difference
is chiefly one of semantics. In conducting the LPE test, the benefits will
presumably be articulated and measured in terms of state policy objectives
in much the same fashion as is done in a Cantor analysis. In this view, the
LPE is essentially an application of the SAE without the prerequisite that the
activity be required by the state; the gap is filled by the requirement that the
state must have delegated self-regulatory power to the occupation in order
for it to qualify as a learned profession. 96
A pre-Bates district court case having a close factual connection to
Goldfarb97 illustrates the relevance of both LPE and SAE analysis to
antitrust problems in the legal profession. In Surety Title Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia State Bar,98 the plaintiff title company claimed that the
Virginia State Bar's practice of issuing advisory opinions relating to ethics
and the unauthorized practice of law, coupled with the threat of disciplinary
proceedings, constituted an illegal group boycott in violation of the Sherman
Act. These advisory opinions, rendered in a non-adversarial context and
available only to attorneys, were issued by the state bar as an administrative
agency of the Virginia Supreme Court99 and pursuant to a specific grant of
95. Again, this is more likely to be true in the case of a lawyer than for any other
professional. Most professions are regulated under rules established by a board comprised of
private practitioners and delegated authority by state statute. Such rules are merely "au-
thorized" by the state. However, in many cases, the rule-establishing body for the profession
of law is the state supreme court, which is a branch of the state government. Any rules
promulgated by the state supreme court will thus be "requirements" of the state.
96. See note 60 supra.
97. In Goldfarb, the challenged activities were the publication of minimum fee schedules
for title examination. In its discussion, the Goldfarb court noted that the harm was aggravated
by the monopoly held by the legal profession in the field of title examination. In Surety Title
Insurance Agency, Inc., v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), that monopoly
itself was challenged as a boycott. See text accompanying notes 98-106 infra.
98. 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977).
99. VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974).
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power by the court.100 The effect of the opinions was to require the partici-
pation of an attorney in title insurance transactions, making it impossible for
the plaintiff to carry out its plan to reduce prices by eliminating attorney
middlemen. The court found that plaintiff's plan would result in the
consumer receiving greater services at a lower cost,101 and held that the
issuance of such advisory opinions was a classic illustration of a group
boycott. 102
The court then reviewed recent cases on the SAE and the LPE in search
of principles to be applied to anticompetitive activities of the legal profes-
sion. Merging the requirements of the two exemptions, the court first
inquired whether the activity was compelled by the state acting as sovereign.
Since the state bar was required by the state supreme court to render
advisory opinions at the request of a member, the court held that the
issuance of advisory opinions was a product of a state command.10 3 Unlike
the rule in Bates, however, the content of the issued opinions was within the
discretion of the state bar, and thus faced additional tests. The court drew
from Boddicker and Cantor the "common thread of focusing on the
relationship between the anticompetitive activity and the state interest it
purports to advance. If that relationship is tenuous the activity must fall." 104
Under this analytical scheme, the court held that the advisory opinions
violated the Sherman Act. The intended benefit was assurance that only
qualified people would render legal services, and that people rendering such
services would be subject to the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty. Both considerations advance the public interest by "insuring the quality
of the legal services and imposing upon lawyers a degree of accountability
to the state."' 0 5 However, the advisory opinion process was held not
sufficiently related to these interests to justify its anticompetitive effects.l°6
In so deciding, the court noted the availability of less restrictive alternative
means such as the imposition of criminal sanctions.
The striking feature of the court's opinion is that it failed to make any
distinction between the LPE and the SAE, combining the Boddicker and
100, The Supreme Court of Virginia is legislatively empowered to define what constitutes
the practice of law. 431 F. Supp. at 300; VA. CODE § 54-48(a) (1974).
101. 431 F. Supp. at 303.
102. Group boycotts are said to be per se violations of the Sherman Act. Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1962). In Surety Title, the court noted that "there is a split of
authority as to whether the per se or rule of reason test should be applied to substantive
antitrust claims involving the practices of professions. . . .The court need not reach this issue
as it concludes that the practice in question cannot withstand the less demanding rule of reason
and analysis." 431 F. Supp. at 304 n.8.
103. 431 F. Supp. at 307.
104. Id. at 306.
105. Id. at 307.
106. Id. at 307-08.
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Cantor tests without discussion of their different contexts. Since the case
involved the legal profession, which is often eligible for both exemptions,
there was no need to distinguish between the two tests in terms of the
prerequisites of their application; but the additional failure of the court to
discuss the relative characteristics of the two tests supports the conclusion
that they are in fact quite similar, despite their different language. Thus,
although the court's finding that the advisory opinions were required by the
state could be challenged, the same test, phrased differently, would still be
available under the LPE.
Surety Title interprets the SAE and the LPE as two sides of the same
coin. The chief difference is that the "direct connection-minimum extent
necessary" balancing test will be called the SAE when applied to activities
required by the state, and the LPE when applied to activities of professional
associations exercising self-regulatory power delegated by the state.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court denied that the learned professions
were entitled to an absolute exemption from the antitrust laws, but left open
the possibility that they might receive some sort of special treatment. The
Court did not specify the nature of this special treatment, although it did
emphasize the interests of the states in regulating the professions. Then, in
Cantor, state regulatory interests were recognized and protected by an
exemption extending to private activities required by the state and essential
to the maintenance of a state regulatory program. Drawing from Cantor, the
lower courts, particularly in Boddicker and Society of Engineers, have
developed the outlines of the "new" learned profession exemption. Anti-
competitive activities, with the possible exception of price-fixing, will be
subject to a rule of reason analysis balancing their direct contribution to the
public benefit against their harmful anticompetitive effects. This test, em-
ployed even in per se categories, shares with the Cantor test the requirement
that the anticompetitive activity be directly connected to the state regulatory
interest, and have only the minimum anticompetitive effect necessary. In
fact, despite the different language of the two tests, they are quite similar in
operation. The chief difference is that the balancing test is called "the state
action exemption" when applied to activity required by the state, and "the
learned profession exemption" when applied to the activities of an associa-
tion which has been delegated self-regulatory powers by the state. The states
have a special interest in regulating the profession of law, as noted in
Goldfarb. This is reflected in the substantial protection that bar associations
receive under both exemptions, and particularly, as in Bates, in the absolute
immunity granted to direct state action.
1068 [Vol. 1977:1047
